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4 BAR BRIEFS
the banks agreed to surrender the evidences of indebtedness held by the
county against the bank and to accept certificates of deposit, payable in
installments over a period of years. This suit was instituted to test the
validity of the action of the commissioners in this behalf. HELD: That
the commissioners did not exceed the authority vested in them by law.
U. S. SUPREME COURT DECISIONS
Under War Risk Insurance policies a beneficiary named by insured,
who is not permitted to take at the time of insured's death, may receive
the award if Congress later includes him among the permitted class.-
White v. U. S., 46 Sup. Ct. Rep. 274.
The objection that defendant was tried upon two indictments at the
same time and was, therefore, deprived of the full number of jury chal-
lenges that he would have had if tried separately is not one that can be
raised on habeas corpus.-Ashe v. U. S. 46 Sup. Ct. Rep. 333.
Although a public utility in the past may have charged excessive
amounts to depreciation expense, thus accumulating reserve account
balances greater than necessary to maintain adequately the property, it
cannot be required to draw on these balances in order to overcome deficits
in future earnings and to sustain rates which could not otherwise be sus-
tained.-Utility Commission v. New York Tel. Co., 46 Sup. Ct. Rep. 363.
The original general jurisdiction of the District Court is notenlarged
so as to permit suit to be brought in a district where neither plaintiff
nor defendant is an inhabitant, even though the plaintiff could
have brought the suit in a State Court of concurrent jurisdiction
from which the defendant could have removed the case to such District
Court.-Seabord Milling Co. vs. Chicago, Rock Island, 46 Sup. Ct. Rep.
247.
The drainage acts of South Dakota which authorize the assessment
of costs and benefits for maintenance and repair, do not extend to prop-
erty outside of the original drainage district. Where the levy is void
for lack of statutory power to make the levy injunctive relief may be
had without appeal to the state court. The test of Federal equity
jurisdiction is the inadequacy of the remedy on the law side of the
Federal court and not the inadequacy of the remedy in the state courts.
-Risty vs. Chicago, Rock Island, 46 Sup. Ct. Rep. 236.
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A petition by a Federal officer to remove to a Federal Court for trial
a prosecution against him for murder must negative the possibility that
he was doing acts other than official acts at that time and on that
occasion, or make it clear and specific that whatever was done by him
leading to the prosecution was done under color of his Federal official
duty. Mandamus being invoked to secure the return of the prosecution
to the State Courts the Supreme Court granted the writ, holding that
the defendants were not in position to take advantage of Section 33 of
the Judicial Code. In part, the Court said: "The defendants when called
upon to testify before the coroner were not obliged by Federal law to do
so. Indeed, even under state law, they might have stood mute, because
the proceeding was one in which they were accused of crime. They,
themselves, show that they voluntarily made the statements upon which
these indictments were founded. While, of course, it was natural that,
if not guilty, they should have responded fully and freely to all questions
as to their knowledge of the transaction with a view of showing their
innocence, nevertheless their evidence was not in performance of their
duty as officers of the U. S."-Maryland vs. Soper, 46 Sup. Ct. Rep.-.
Summarizing the law as to the nature and extent of the restriction
on state taxation of national banks, the U. S. Supreme Court used the
following language: 1. "The purpose of the restriction is to render
it impossible for any State, in taxing the shares, to create and foster
an unequal and unfriendly competition with national banks, by favoring
shareholders in state banks or individuals interested in private banking
or engaged in operations and investments normally common to the busi-
ness; 2. The term 'other moneyed capital' in the restriction is not in-
tended to include all moneyed capital not invested in national bank
shares, but only that which is employed in such a way as to bring it
into substantial competition with the business of national banks: 3.
Moneyed capital is brought into such competition where it is invested in
shares of state banks or in private banking, and also where it is em-
ployed substantially as in the loan and investment features of banking,
in making investments by way of loan, discount or otherwise, in notes,
bonds or other securities with a view to sale or repayment and re-invest-
ment; 4. The restriction is not intended to exact mathematical equality
in the taxing of national bank shares and such other moneyed capital,
nor to do more than require such practical equality as is reasonably
attainable in view of the differing situations of such properties. But
every clear discrimination against national bank shares and in favor
of a relatively material part of other moneyed capital employed in sub-
stantial competition with national banks is a violation of both the letter
and spirit of the restriction."-First National Bank vs. Anderson, 46
Sup. Ct. Rep. 135.
